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 	It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the “affective” aspect (i.e., the hurtfulness) of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. First, we argue that functionalism gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives rise to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. Second, we argue that the qualia theory fails to capture the sense in which pain’s affective phenomenology rationalizes various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviors. Since it escapes both of these problems, we argue that representationalism has a significant advantage in the debates about pain’s affective phenomenology. We end the paper by examining objections, including the question of what representationalists should say about so-called “disassociation cases,” such as pain asymbolia. 
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I. Introduction
	Representationalism is an attractive position in the philosophy of mind. It holds out the promise of a unified account of mental phenomena, drawing together phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. There are, however, a number of challenges that representationalism faces. One of the main ones, and the one that will be the focus of this article, is how to account for the experience of pain. In particular, representationalism looks to be the wrong sort of view to explain pain’s negative affect.
	The problem of pain’s affective phenomenology is taken to be damning for representationalism. In contrast, the two main rivals to representationalism qua theory of phenomenal consciousness—functionalism and qualia theory—seem far better positioned to account for pain’s affect. Our goal in this article is to reverse this assessment. We will argue that when it comes to pain experience, there is a lot that representationalism gets right and that these rivals get wrong. More specifically, we will argue that, unlike these rival theories, representationalism can account for how pain’s affective phenomenology causally explains and rationalizes various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behavior. To be clear, we will not argue that representationalism is the only theory capable of explaining how pain’s affective phenomenology causally explains and rationalizes these beliefs, desires, and behaviors—as we’ll see, there are other theories that can explain this as well. Our goal is more limited: we will simply argue that representationalism can accomplish this and that functionalism and the qualia theory (as standardly construed) cannot. In virtue of this argument, we look to reverse the relative assessments concerning negative affect: representationalism is better positioned to handle pain’s affect than its traditional rivals. What was thought to be a weakness is in fact a strength.
	As should be clear from our remarks so far, we focus solely on pain’s affect and how the three theories fair in accounting for it. Even if our arguments prove correct here, we will not have shown that representationalism is a superior theory of pain, all things considered. Negative affect is only one among many puzzling aspects of painful experiences that a philosophical theory would need to address. Our arguments here should be seen, then, as contributing to a sufficient defense of representationalism as a theory of pain, and not as itself constituting such a defense. (Our arguments do not, for example, engage Murat Aydede’s sophisticated criticism of a representationalist theory of pain that focuses upon an argument concerning the semantics of pain reports and experiences.​[1]​ As we see it, these concerns are largely distinct from the problem of pain’s affect and as such, they will not be our focus here.) Nonetheless, since negative affect is commonly taken to be a particularly thorny issue for the representationalist, our contribution here is significant.
	Here is how the article will unfold. In Section II, we start by explaining what the problem of pain’s affect is, why it seems especially damning to representationalism, and why both functionalism and the qualia theory appear to be better positioned to handle it. We will then argue that both of these rivals to representationalism fail to do justice to the connection between pain’s affective phenomenology and the various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behavior to which it gives rise. In Section III we show that functionalism fails to accommodate the fact that pain’s affective phenomenology causally explains such beliefs, desires, and behavior. Those steeped in the literature on functionalism will recognize this complaint as related to more general concerns about the causal efficacy of functional properties. Our point is that this general concern can be used to undermine functionalism, and promote representationalism, as a theory of pain’s affect. As we shall see, this point has not had the impact it should have on those who are drawn to functionalism as a theory of pain’s affect.
In Section IV we show that pain experiences not only cause, but also rationalize, these bodily-directed beliefs, desires and behaviors. A proper appreciation of this point serves to undermine the qualia theory of pain experience, or so we argue. Although we are not the only ones to recognize these rational relations, our novel contribution comes in the degree to which we plum this intuition. Unlike more superficial appeals to this idea, we focus exclusively on the ability of pain’s affective phenomenology (as opposed to other aspects of its phenomenology) to rationalize beliefs and desires. We also go to greater lengths than other accounts to explain how, exactly, pain’s affective phenomenology rationalizes belief and desires. This, in turn, allows us to provide a precise diagnosis of the failure of the qualia theory and the triumph of representationalism with regard to this important, but underexplored, issue.
We end, in Section V, by considering some objections. We first consider and reject the suggestion that the qualia theorist has an advantage in explaining why it is rational to avoid painful experiences. We then ask whether our position struggles to accommodate disassociation syndromes regarding pain. We argue that despite initial appearances, a sufficiently sophisticated variety of representationalism has resources to handle these tricky cases.  

II. Representationalism and the Problem of Pain’s Affect 
Although there are many sub-theories that fall under the representationalist umbrella, we can, following the lead of David Chalmers, unite them in virtue of their identification of a phenomenal property with the property of having a particular representational content in a certain manner.​[2]​ The kind of representationalist theory that we will explore in this paper—the position that is the central representationalist position in the current debate on pain—is “reductive” in that it analyzes the notion of “having a particular representational content in a certain manner” in entirely physicalist-friendly terms. More specifically, this kind of representationalist position is committed to: 
1) giving a theory of content in non-phenomenal terms, 
2) showing that the representational contents of experience can be specified independently of any phenomenal terms, and
3) explaining the difference between phenomenal representation and non-phenomenal representation in non-phenomenal terms.
In addition to being “reductivist” in the above sense, the representationalist position that we are focused on explicates the phenomenal character of pain experience in terms of representational content that concerns one’s own body.​[3]​ 
The phenomenal character of pain experience is widely thought to present a problem to such a position, a problem that is unique relative to the more general complaints often leveled against reductive representationalism. The problem stems from the claim that the phenomenal character of pain experience has two general aspects: a sensory-discriminative aspect and an affective aspect. (As we shall see shortly, it’s possible that these general aspects can be further broken down.) The sensory-discriminative aspect of pain phenomenology seems to involve a conscious awareness of the state of a region of one’s body: a throbbing in my ankle, a twinge in my back, etc. This is the aspect of pain phenomenology that motivated so-called “perceptual” theories of pain—i.e., theories that identified pain experience as a form of bodily perception.​[4]​ This aspect straightforwardly admits of representationalist treatment: my pain experience discriminates (i.e., makes me aware of) a throbbing bodily state in my ankle by representing my ankle as having a pulsing disorder; my pain experience discriminates a state of minor damage in my back by representing my back as undergoing mild and brief damage, etc.
The other aspect of the phenomenal character of pain experience—the affective aspect—is supposed to be a thorn in the side of the representationalist; in his entry on pain in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Aydede lists the affective aspect of pain phenomenology as one of two major objections to representationalism about pain experience.​[5]​ (To be clear, theorists working on the empirical study of pain sometimes further divide its affective side into an arousal and a valence subcomponent: the former concerns a range of bodily changes (e.g., the increased heart rate, muscle tensing, etc. that frequently accompanies bodily damage), while the latter has to do with what makes the object of pain seem awful. It is the latter, not the former, which provides the challenge to the representationalist. To avoid any confusion on this score, we want to emphasize that we are using expressions like “the affective aspect of pain phenomenology” to refer to valence, not arousal.​[6]​) We will interpret the basic problem for the representationalist in the following way: the affective aspect of pain phenomenology does not seem discriminative—its purpose is not about placing some bodily state before the conscious mind. Rather, this aspect of pain phenomenology seems motivational—its purpose is to motivate the subject to rid herself of the mental state (i.e., the pain experience) that has this phenomenology. (It should be noted that our interpretation of the problem facing representationalism diverges from Aydede’s. He focuses on the question of what, exactly, the affective aspect of pain phenomenology is representing about the body. We will return to this question in Section V.b.)
For this reason, representational content about one’s own body looks like the wrong kind of thing to capture the affective aspect of pain phenomenology. To capture that aspect, a theory should not be focused on features of the body that pain-experience represents (as representationalism does). Rather it should instead focus on (non-representational) features of the experience itself—features that explain why pain experience has the unique impact upon our belief, desires, and behaviors that it does.	
We can highlight the problem by contrasting the representationalist account with the accounts offered by some of its competitors. In the larger literature on phenomenal consciousness, representationalism has two main rivals: functionalism and qualia theories of experience. Given how we described the problem above, both of these competing theories seem better positioned to account for the affective aspect of pain phenomenology than representationalism. 
Functionalism, for instance, maintains that the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by the functional properties of that state. Unlike representationalism, such an theory offers a straightforward account of the affective aspect of pain phenomenology: the reason this aspect of the phenomenology is motivational—the reason it has the unique impact it does upon our beliefs, desires, and behaviors—is because this aspect of the phenomenology is determined by functional properties that obtain between the pain experience and those very beliefs, desires, and behaviors. So, in virtue of having its affective phenomenology (i.e., in virtue of having the aforementioned functional properties), a pain experience is guaranteed to make the unique impact it does upon our beliefs, desires, and behavior. 
The other rival to representationalism is a qualia theory that maintains that an experience’s phenomenal character is determined by intrinsic features of that state.​[7]​ Such a theory also seems better poised to capture the affective aspect of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In particular, a qualia theory that posits what Brian Loar calls “raw qualia”—i.e., non-relational, introspectible properties of experience that “are not in themselves, not intrinsically, representational or intentional” ​[8]​—seems well poised to capture the affective aspect of pain phenomenology. Under the (raw) qualia theory, the affective aspect of pain phenomenology is determined by intrinsic features of the experience itself, features that do not purport to refer to regions of the body. Austen Clark nicely describes the manner in which such a theory can explain the motivational nature of the affective aspect of pain phenomenology:
…what makes pain bad is intrinsic to pain: the hurtful, painful, to-be-avoided character of pain is an intrinsic property of the mental state, and it provides a reason to avoid the state.​[9]​

To summarize: in order to do justice to the affective aspect of pain phenomenology, it appears that a theory needs to focus on something other than the representational content that experience carries about bodily states. It needs to focus on a feature (either functional or intrinsic) of the experience itself, a feature that explains why affective pain phenomenology motivates the subject in the manner that it does. We’ve seen, in brief outline, how two of representationalism’s competitors—functionalism and qualia theories—are poised to provide such an explanation. Of course, it could be that representationalism is better poised to capture the sensory-discriminative and/or the arousal aspect of experience than either these other theories. Indeed, a popular position in the literature is to advance a so-called “mixed view,” with representationalism accounting for the discriminative aspect of pain experiences and functionalism or a qualia theory explaining its affective dimension.​[10]​ But with regard to pain’s affect, representationalism appears to be outclassed by both functionalism and qualia theories.

III. Functionalism and Pain’s Affect
	Despite appearances, we will argue in this section that functionalism struggles to offer an adequate account of pain’s affect. To see the problem, it will help to have a simple example before us. Someone stomps on your toe, causing it to throb with pain. You form the desire for the pain to stop. You jump up and down and yell “ouch”. Focusing on the immediate effect, why did you form the desire for the experience to stop? Because the experience, the pain, was unpleasant. Your pain experience has a certain quality, it feels a certain way, and it is that feeling, the pain’s affect, which explains the ensuing desire and the eventual behavior. We need to see how functionalism understands this affect. 
	It would seem that functionalism is well positioned to capture pain’s affect. After all, it defines pain in terms of its causal-explanatory role, a role that will surely capture the experience’s causal effects on subsequent mental states and bodily behavior. However, it is just this definitional move that leaves it awkwardly placed to give an adequate account. For consider the state that causes you to form the desire for the experience to stop. What makes it the case that the state is unpleasant? In what does its unpleasantness consist? According to functionalism, it is unpleasant because, among other effects, it causes you to want it to stop. But this gets the explanatory direction the wrong way around. Echoing Plato’s Euthyphro, you want the experience to stop because it is unpleasant, it is not the case that it is unpleasant because you want it to stop. That is, the felt quality of pain, or at least its affective dimension, explains the desire. But the functionalist wants the desire to explain the affect.
	This is of course an old objection to functionalism. Consider, for example, what Janet Levin says about ‘wincing’: “If pain is functionally defined (either by an a priori or an empirical theory) as the state of being in some lower-level state or other that, in certain circumstances causes wincing, then it seems that the generalization that pain causes wincing (in those circumstances) is at best uninformative, since the state in question would not be pain if it didn’t.”​[11]​ Nonetheless, some philosophers who theorize about pain’s affect would do well to reflect on its full import. For example, in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on pain, Aydede seems to appreciate the force of this concern when it is applied to the conative reactions to pain experience, but loses sight of it when considering so-called “mixed views” of pain. Aydede claims that “cognitivists” about pain—i.e., those who claim that the painfulness of pain consists in the experiencer’s conative reactions to the experience—are committed to a counterintuitive account of the relation between the feeling of pain and the conative states to which it gives rise. In short, they (cognitivists) are committed to saying the experience was painful because the experiencer desired that it stop. Here is how Aydede puts the point:
[T]his move [cognitivism] appears to mislocate the problem. The question is: in what does the painfulness, the hurting quality, of pains consist? The answer offered seems to be: in our cognitive/conative reactions to the experience, something like having a desire for it to stop, for instance. But one would think that it is because the experience is painful that one desires it to stop, not the other way around.​[12]​ 

What is strange is that a mere three pages later, when he turns to discussing theories that focus on the motivational aspect of pain, he remarks that:
All they need to do to accommodate pain’s affective phenomenology is to say that the feeling of pain involves perception although perception doesn’t exhaust its nature: feeling pain is also an affective/emotional experience that can be explained in terms of the functional role of pain’s sensory/representational content.​[13]​ 

Here Aydede entertains a “mixed view” of pain, with its sensory/intentional component given a representationalist treatment and its affective component given a functional one.
	Although a natural theoretical move, it is untenable, and for the same reason that cognitivism was—it gets the explanatory direction the wrong way around. If cognitivism mislocates the painfulness of pain in the experiencer’s desire for it to stop, it is hard to see how locating that painfulness in that desire plus numerous other effects, as functionalism does, is supposed to fare better. If we desire for the pain to stop because it is painful, then surely, these other effects, e.g., saying “ouch” or jumping up and down, are also to be explained, in part, by pain’s affect. So, pace Aydede, the affective aspect of pain experience cannot be explained in terms of its functional role.
In light of the argument from explanatory direction, there are two things to notice. First, representationalism deftly avoids the problem. According to representationalism, the phenomenology of a pain experience is determined by its representational content, and not by its functional relations to various inputs, other mental states, and behavioral outputs. (A complication arises: if one gave a theory of content that maintains that content was determined by functional role, then the content of a pain experience—and, hence, its phenomenal character—would be defined, in part, by its causal connection to various effects. This complication has little impact on our argument, for most practicing representationalists do not give a theory of content where the content of experience is fixed by that state’s functional role.) In virtue of this fact, representationalism gets the order of explanation right: you desire for the pain to stop, you say “ouch” and jump and down because of how the pain feels (i.e., because of its representational content).​[14]​ Pain doesn’t feel the way it does because it generates these various effects. Representationalism respects this fact; functionalism does not.
 The second thing to notice is that in theorizing about pain’s affect, it is not enough simply to make pain a cause of subsequent beliefs and desires. Functionalism did that. What we need to do is to secure the proper explanation between pain and its effects. When you stomp on my toe, I want my toe to stop hurting because of the way it feels. That looks to be an informative explanation, whereas for a functionalist it is a definitional truth without empirical content. That’s an important insight and one that bears further reflection. As we will see below, reflection on the nature of this explanation produces some significant insights.  

IV. The Qualia Theory and Pain’s Affect
Let’s turn to the other non-representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness: the qualia theory. When applied to the case of pain, this theory claims the affective aspect of pain phenomenology is an intrinsic, not a functional, property of pain experience. As a result, the quaila theory avoids functionalism’s troubles with the order of explanation argument from the previous section. But it suffers from an equally damning problem: it fails to do justice to the sense in which the affective aspect of pain phenomenology rationalizes various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviors. 
To explain this problem, we first need to say more about how, in general, experiences “rationalize” beliefs. This will require an excursion into the literature on perceptual experience and its relationship to perceptual belief. As the terrain here is complex, it will take some time for us to articulate our preferred reading of how experiences “rationalize.” But we promise that there will be a substantial payoff for our understanding of pain.

IV.a Excursion into the Visual Experience Literature
Consider a simple example of a visual experience and an ensuing belief. You have a visual experience as of a cold beer before your eyes. You thereby come to believe that there is a cold beer on the table and, given your desire for such a drink, you reach out and grab it. Not only does your experience cause your belief, there is also a kind of rational connection between the two. Here is how Richard Heck puts the general point:
I do not just find myself having certain beliefs, such as that there is a brown desk in front of me, having no idea where they came from; it is not as if perceptual experience gives rise to perceptual beliefs in the same sort of way a bump on the head might cause me to believe that I am Napoleon. On the contrary, I see the desk, and I believe that it is there for that reason, not just because I see it there. To be only slightly more precise: The formation of perceptual beliefs is a rational (not just a causal) process.​[15]​ 

Although the basic idea that experience “rationalizes” belief about external objects has generated an enormous philosophical literature, what matters for our purposes are the arguments about how certain theories of experience fail to accommodate the claim that experience rationalizes belief about the surrounding environment. 
One view that fails notoriously in this regard is the sense-datum theory. Although there are different characterizations of this failure, ours will exploit the notion of an experience’s “presentational character”.​[16]​ An experience’s presentational character is what we seem to be aware of when we introspect it; it’s what the experience “presents” to the conscious mind. According to the sense-datum theory, the presentational character of a visual experience is determined by something other than the external objects/properties that are the subject matter of our perceptual beliefs; according to this theory, a visual experience’s presentational character is determined by properties of sense data. This, in turn, leads to a problem: how can the presentational character of a visual experience provide a reason to believe in the existence of external objects (like the beer on the table) if that presentational character does not “present” those objects? 
We are not claiming that under the sense-datum theory it is impossible to make sense of any epistemic relation between experience and belief about external object. (For instance, it’s possible that, given the right “externalist” account of justification, visual experiences—as construed by the sense-datum theorist—could justify beliefs about external objects. It’s even possible that the “best explanation” of various facets of the presentational characters of our visual experiences, as construed by the sense-datum theorist, is that those experiences are caused by external objects. Although, following the lead of Armstrong, we worry that this second route makes the existence of external objects a theoretical posit as opposed to something that is presented by visual experience.​[17]​) Our complaint is simply that the sense-datum theory makes it impossible to make sense of a particular epistemic relation between perceptual experience and belief: a relation where the presentational character of a perceptual experience provides what Bill Brewer calls a “non-instrumental” reason in favor of a belief about an external object.​[18]​ To introduce this idea, let’s start with a contrast case: a case involving an “instrumental” reason. An instrumental reason is the kind of reason you have, in virtue of reading a dial of an ammeter, for believing that the current running through an electrical circuit is 5 amps. Notice that having an instrumental reason for believing that the current is 5 amps goes beyond merely having the visual experience of the dial, for someone who was ignorant of how the ammeter works could have the same visual experience of the dial and not have a reason to believe that there is a 5 amps current running through the circuit. 
We think that visual experiences provide non-instrumental reasons for believing in the existence of various external objects; the reason your visual experience provides for believing in the existence of the beer does not “go beyond” the presentational character of experience itself. We think the presentational character of the experience serves as a (defeasible) reason all on its own to believe there is a beer on the table; solely in virtue of their presentational character, visual experiences provide non-instrumental (but defeasible) reasons in favor of various beliefs about external objects. 
This is the epistemic relation that the sense-data theory fails to capture, for under that theory the presentational character of a visual experience involves properties of sense-data and, as a result, can only provide an instrumental reason in favor of your beliefs about material objects in the surrounding environment. (Things are more complicated when we consider phenomenalism, idealism, and any other theory that posits that “external objects” are mere collections of sense-data. It strikes us that the cure offered by these views is worse than the disease, so we will ignore them and take the “indirect realist” versions as paradigmatic. We are also ignoring Frank Jackson’s version of the sense-datum theory, which posits that, despite being immaterial objects, sense-data are located in the physical space before the eyes.​[19]​) Given its affinities to the sense-data theory, it is perhaps unsurprising that the qualia theory of visual experience also fails to accommodate this epistemic relation and for the same basic reason. For under the qualia theory, the presentational character of a visual experience involves intrinsic features of that very experience, features that do not purport to refer to external objects. Under such an approach, visual experiences can, at best, provide an instrumental reason in favor of beliefs about material objects in the surrounding environment. 
	The struggles of the sense-datum and qualia theories impart the following lesson: in order to accommodate the claim that visual experiences provide non-instrumental reasons for beliefs about external objects, a theory of experience must identify the presentational characters of visual experiences with those external objects and their features. We put this lesson in a deliberately abstract fashion in order to limit its commitments. In contrast, some wish to impose additional requirements. Some, for example, claim that, in order for its presentational character to rationalize beliefs about external objects, visual experiences must carry representational content that concerns those objects.​[20]​ Others follow John McDowell farther down this road and claim that visual experiences must carry a specific kind of representational content, namely, conceptual content.​[21]​ 
	For purposes of this paper, however, all that matters is that everyone involved in these debates (Heck, McDowell, etc.) agree that the sense-datum and qualia theories fail to explain how visual experience rationalizes belief; it’s just that they have more or less specific explanations of how these theories fail. By framing the problem facing the sense-datum/qualia theories in general terms—by framing it in terms of presentational character and not in terms of (different kinds of) representational content about external objects/properties—we can avoid weighing in on these additional debates.
	Given our framing of the struggles of the sense-datum and qualia theory, it should be clear that one theory that has the machinery necessary to accommodate the claim that visual experiences rationalize beliefs is representationalism. Representationalism says that the presentational character of an experience is determined by the representational content it carries; if that representational content concerns external objects and their features, then the presentational character of that experience will involve those objects and features. As a result, this presentational character can provide a non-instrumental reason in favor of beliefs about those objects/features. Problem solved.
Note that we are not claiming that representationalism is the only theory that has the necessary machinery. It’s possible that a “naïve realist” account that maintained that visual experience acquainted us (in a non-representational manner) with the physical objects/properties before our eyes could also accommodate the claim that visual experiences provide a non-instrumental reason in favor of beliefs about external objects.​[22]​ It’s also possible that a suitably modified version of the sense-datum theory—a version that maintained that what we call “external objects” are collections of sense-data—could accommodate this claim as well. None of this, however, diminishes our argument. For what’s really matter about all this, for us, is just that representationalism can accommodate this claim while sense-datum theories (ignoring phenomenalism) and qualia theories cannot. (As we mentioned in Section II, it’s possible to run a version of the qualia account where qualia are treated as “intentionalized,” not “raw.” Under an “intentionalized” qualia account, perhaps visual experiences could provide a non-instrumental reason for believing various things about external objects. As we have made clear, however, our target here is the “raw” qualia account.)

IV.b The Payoff for Understanding Pain’s Affect
	Now let’s move away from visual experience and back to the affective aspect of pain phenomenology. We think the affective aspect of pain phenomenology stands in a rational relation to a wide range of beliefs, desires, and behaviors. In what follows, we are going to focus on a subset of these beliefs, desires, and behaviors: namely, those directed at one’s own body. (In Section V.a, we will examine beliefs, desires, and behaviors that are directed at one’s pain experience.) Return to the example of someone’s stomping on your toe. The affective aspect of the phenomenology of this experience—the hurtfulness of the experience—stands in a rational relation to various beliefs, desires, and behaviors directed at your toe. You do not find yourself hopping up and down, believing your toe is damaged, etc. for no reason; you do these things because of the awful way that your toe feels. The awful way that your toe feels does not merely cause the ensuing behaviors and mental states; it also rationalizes them. More carefully, the way your toe feels provides a non-instrumental reason for these beliefs, desires, and behaviors; all on its own, the affective aspect of the phenomenology of your pain experience gives you a (defeasible) reason to believe, desire, and act in the way that you do. We think this point has significant but largely unrecognized implications​[23]​ for theories of the affective aspect of pain’s phenomenology. It is to these implications that we now turn.
	First, we want to draw attention to an issue that we find compelling and that has not seemed to receive any attention in the philosophy of mind literature on pain, namely, that pain’s affect gives you a reason, not only to believe that your toe hurts but also to form the desire for the pain to stop. In its way, it is a radical idea, as it breaks from the more common practice of treating experiences as only capable of rationalizing beliefs. (For the purposes of undermining the qualia theory, we could drop the reference to desires entirely, and run our argument with the less radical idea that pain experiences rationalize beliefs about what body part hurts. Those with grave concerns about the viability of rationalizing desires are invited to make the necessary elision.) But as we see it, desires can enter into “the space of reasons”, to borrow John McDowell’s phrase. 
	We will say a bit more here to motivate the claim that pain experiences can rationalize desires. First, return to one of the upshots of the argument from explanatory direction against functionalism. There we saw that functionalism fails, not because it can’t make sense of pain’s causing subsequent desires, but that it can’t make sense of the way in which the quality of a pain experience explains our desiring it to stop. The reason we want the pain to stop, we might say, is because of the way it feels. That locution in itself is, of course, compatible with a mere causal, and not rational, relation. But reflect on other platitudes that come to mind concerning the relation between pain experiences and desires. We might say that it makes sense that one wants the pain to stop in light of the way it feels. Or, that if someone had had an experience with just that quality, and holding fixed her other propositional attitudes, we would find it unintelligible that she wouldn’t want the experience to stop. As we see it, these locutions point in the direction of the rational scrutabilty of the relation between pain experiences and subsequent desires.
	Insofar as representationalism treats pain experiences as contentful (whether that content be conceptual or non-conceptual), it facilitates our understanding of how pain experiences could rationalize desires. It is an issue that undoubtedly merits more attention, but it speaks in favor of representationalism that it highlights it and has, at least prima facie, the resources to accommodate it.
	Leaving behind the issue of pain’s affect rationalizing desire, let us turn to another (underexplored) implication of the idea that pain rationalizes bodily-directed beliefs, etc. It’s this second implication that will result in an objection to qualia theories of pain’s affect. The qualia theory of pain experience maintains that the presentational character of a pain experience is exhausted by intrinsic features of the experience itself, features that do not purport to refer, a so-called “raw” qualia view. For reasons given in Section IV.a, it should be clear that such a theory is incapable of accommodating the claim that the affective aspect of your pain phenomenology provides a non-instrumental reason for your toe-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviors. The problem is that in order to accommodate this claim, at least some of the presentational character of your pain-experience must involve your toe. 
In reply, the defender of qualia might offer a “mixed view” of pain: she might claim that part of the presentational character of the pain experience—the sensory-discriminatory part—is determined by representational content that concerns one’s toe, but that the affective part of this presentational character is entirely the result of the experience’s intrinsic features. But this mixed view doesn’t get the job done either. The intuition that is causing trouble for the qualia theory is that it is the affective aspect of pain phenomenology that serves as a non-instrumental reason for believing various things about your toe; it is how awful your toe feels that provides a non-instrumental reason in favor of your various toe-beliefs, toe-desires, and toe-behaviors. The qualia theorist cannot accommodate this intuition by claiming that a non-affective aspect of pain phenomenology is representationally directed at the toe.  
We’ve reached a substantial conclusion: representationalism can explain how the affective aspect of pain phenomenology can provide a non-instrumental reason in favor of various bodily directed beliefs, etc., while a qualia theory cannot. It is worth locating this conclusion, and the considerations cited in favor of it, relative to the greater literature on pain experience. As we said earlier, the basic idea that pain experience rationalizes bodily-directed beliefs has been noted within the pain literature. However, the extant appeals to this idea are underdeveloped; typically, the authors make this claim only in passing and not as a linchpin of an argument for (or against) particular theories of pain experience. Consider, for example, the following passage from Tye:
Pain is normally very unpleasant. People in pain try to get rid of it or to diminish it. Why? The answer surely is because pain feels unpleasant or bad, because it is experienced as such…It is precisely because this is the case that normal subjects have the cognitive reactions to pain they do, reactions such as desiring the pain to stop.​[24]​ 

There is a way of reading this passage where Tye is making the same basic point that we make: namely, that pain experience rationalizes bodily-directed belief and desire. But there is also a way of reading the passage—i.e., in which we understand the “because” in merely causal, not rational, terms—where Tye is not making our point. And even if Tye does intend to make our point in this passage, he needs to say more than he does in defense of it. For instance, he needs to say more about how, exactly, such experiences rationalize these cognitive reactions. 
In our experience, when people gesture towards the idea that pain experience rationalizes belief it is often unclear whether they intend to be making this claim about pain’s sensory-discriminative phenomenology or its affective phenomenology. (Tye is an exception in that he makes it clear, in the above passage, that he is dealing with the affective phenomenology of pain.) What’s more, in failing to articulate the details of how pain experience rationalizes belief, such appeals lack the argumentative force they could (and should) have as an objection to qualia theories. In fact, these appeals are often not even explicitly presented as objections to the qualia theory. This is certainly the case in the above passage. (Helm is an exception to this trend; he explicitly raises the intuition that pain experiences rationalize belief as an objection to the qualia theory and to call attention to the rational relation between the pain experience and the subsequent desire.​[25]​ Nonetheless, we feel that our exposition, which relies upon the notions of “presentational character” and “non-instrumental reasons”, is superior to his. Moreover, his interest is more in how pain rationally requires the subject to be disposed to a range of “emotional commitments”.​[26]​) 
We have aimed to remedy these shortcomings. To start, we have taken steps to isolate the affective aspect of pain’s phenomenology in making this claim: it’s the awfulness you feel in your toe that rationalizes the toe-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviors you have. What’s more, we have co-opted some technical machinery from the visual perception literature (“presentational character,” “non-instrumental reasons”, etc.) to detail the exact failure of the qualia theory of pain’s affective phenomenology. This level of detail is important; without it, the reader might well fail to appreciate the shortcomings of the qualia theory. 
To sum it all up, then, what we’ve shown is that the only way a theory can capture the intuition that the affective aspect of pain phenomenology provides a non-instrumental reason for various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviors is in virtue of maintaining that the presentational character of the affective aspect of pain experience involves regions of the body. In virtue of identifying the presentational character of the affective aspect of pain with intrinsic features of experience, the qualia theory (even under a “mixed view”) is incapable of accomplishing this. Representationalism, in contrast, is positioned to say something informative about this component. If a representationalist maintains that the affective aspect of pain phenomenology is determined by representational content about one’s toe, then the presentational character of this experience will provide a non-instrumental reason for believing that something awful is happening in your toe and for acting accordingly. 
	
V. Two Objections and Two Replies
We will consider two objections to our defense of representationalism concerning pain experience. The first is on behalf of the qualia theorist; the second is for a theorist who maintains that empirical research shows that we must keep the sensory/perceptual aspect of pain experience distinct from its affective aspect.

V.b Doesn’t Pain Also Rationalize Experience-Directed Beliefs, Desires, and Behaviors? 
 A qualia theorist might make his own appeal to the ability of pain phenomenology to rationalize beliefs, desires, and behavior. In addition to rationalizing various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviors, the affective aspect of pain phenomenology also provides a reason to get rid of the pain experience itself: if you can’t do anything about the damage in your toe, it’s rational to take a drug that eliminates (or diminishes) your pain experience. This, in turn, could be offered as a point in favor of the qualia theory, for that theory seems to give a straightforward account of why it’s rational to take such a drug: namely, some of the affective aspect of pain phenomenology is the result of intrinsic features of the pain experience itself.
	But the representationalist can also explain why the affective aspect of pain’s phenomenology provides a reason to take such a drug. To see how, we first need to say something about the nature of introspection. To start with, note that the kind of representationalism we’ve been pursuing seems to threaten the idea that we have introspective access to our experiences. If, in attempting to introspect our perceptual experiences, what we seem to be aware of are properties of something other than those experiences—e.g., if in attempting to introspect our pain experience, what we seem to be aware of is something awful that happens in our toe, then how can we acquire introspective knowledge of our experiences at all?
	Dretske and Tye, among others, answer this question by treating introspection as being an instance of “displaced perception”.​[27]​ The basic idea is that introspective knowledge of facts about one’s experience relies on an inference; one starts with an awareness of the presentational character of one’s experience—i.e., an awareness of external objects/properties—and thereby comes to learn a fact about one’s experience: namely, that it is representing those external objects/properties. As Tye puts it: “We attend to one thing—the external surfaces and qualities—and yet thereby we are aware of something else, the ‘feel’ of our experience”.​[28]​ Under this account, our awareness of our own experiences is mediated by an inference and, as a result, our direct experiential awareness of external surfaces and qualities provides an instrumental reason for believing that we are undergoing a certain type of experience.
With this picture of introspection in place, let’s return to the question of how the presentational character of your pain experience—how that awful feeling in your toe—can provide a reason to take action with regard to your experience. Awful things are, well, awful and it’s rational, if circumstances allow, to avoid experiencing them. In attending to the awful feeling when someone stomps on your toe—a feeling that seems contained within your foot—you thereby become aware of the fact that your experience is representing an awful thing. If you cease to represent this awful thing—say, by taking a drug that impacts the vehicle of representation—you will cease to be aware of its awfulness. Of course, ceasing to be aware of the awful thing in your toe doesn’t guarantee that there it isn’t something awful still happening in your toe. But it does guarantee that you will not experience it, and that’s significant; nobody wants needlessly to experience an awful thing. 
Given that it is rational, if circumstances allow, to avoid experiencing awful things, it follows that it is rational to take action towards the vehicle of representation: the experience. As we see it, then, the reason to take action towards your pain experience is not because the experience has intrinsic features that are themselves awful; instead, the reason to take action towards your pain experience is because it makes you aware of features of your toe that are awful.
In this manner, a representationalist can explain why the affective aspect of pain’s phenomenology provides a reason to take a drug that impacts the pain experience while not impacting the actual bodily damage. So it is not as if the qualia theorist has the only explanation of why it’s rational to take such a drug. What’s more, unlike the qualia theorist’s explanation, the representationalist account does not commit us to the introspectively problematic claim that the affective aspect of pain phenomenology (at least in part) seems like an intrinsic feature of experience. Under the representationalist account, only your toe feels awful, the experience does not. (This last point, the point that our pain-experience seems “transparent” to our toe, is emphasized repeatedly in the work of Tye.​[29]​)

V.b Does Pain Asymbolia Undermine Representationalism?
	We turn now to consider another objection. One of the upshots of Section IV is a blurring of the distinction between pain’s sensory-discriminative and affective aspects: the affective aspect of the pain phenomenology that results from someone’s stomping on your toe rationally motivates you by providing a non-instrumental reason for various toe-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviors. The only way it can do this is in virtue of having a presentational character that involves something happening in your toe. But this brings us back towards the sensory-discriminatory aspect of pain phenomenology, the aspect that seems to involve a conscious awareness of the state of a region of one’s body. 
	This blurring of the sensory-discriminative and affect aspects invites an objection. There is good reason to keep these two aspects distinct, urges this objector, namely that in so-called disassociation cases, these aspects in fact come apart. In these cases, a subject identifies an experience as pain but does not find it unpleasant. She has a pain that, as it were, does not hurt. Such cases look tailor made to support “mixed views” of pain. And they look especially problematic for views, like our own, that seek to blur these elements of the pain experience.
	By way of response, we will identify some resources a representationalist has to handle such disassociation cases. Our discussion here will not be, nor is it intended to be, a complete account of disassociative pain experiences from a representationalist’s perspective. Such an account merits its own paper. Our goal will be more modest. We wish to show that the representationalist has ample room to maneuver here, that he need not simply concede that disassociation cases present a serious difficulty for his view.
	Before exploring those maneuvers, however, it is worth giving more details concerning the disassociation cases. We will focus on pain asymbolia; a similar description could be given for so-called morphine pain. A pain asymbolic exhibits the following characteristics. First, he is able to detect and discriminate painful stimuli. So, he can recognize the sensation’s quality, intensity and location. He will say that the sensation he is experiencing is a “pain.” However, in responding to it, the asymbolic shows no withdrawal behavior whatsoever. He does not grimace, or wince, or complain. He will say that he feels the hurtful stimuli, that it “hurt him a bit” but that it does not bother him at all.​[30]​ Indeed, the asymbolic will often laugh when stimulated and will sometimes offer his hands for painful testing. He does not show any avoidance behavior or protective reactions or anxiety on seeing the approach of painful instruments. He also does not show any “motor and affective reactions” to visual threats or verbal menaces. Finally, he is not able to learn “appropriate escape or avoidance reactions.”​[31]​ 
	What we have then is someone who says that he is experiencing pain, who groups his current experience with other sensations of pain, but who does not show, nor even apparently have the disposition for, any of the classic pain behaviors, none of the withdrawal or protective behaviors. Using Grahek’s phrase, he seems to experience pain that is not painful, to feel pain but not be in pain.
	It seems clear that in these cases, something like the sensory-discriminatory aspect of pain gets disassociated from the affective-motivational component. But nothing requires that such a disassociation involve an intentional feature of the experience becoming disassociated from a non-intentional one, as a mixed view proposes. Perhaps a crude representationalist who has only a simple content for a pain experience would be hard pressed to handle disassociation cases. But if the pain experience has a layered content, then disassociation could involve the pulling apart of these layers of representational content.​[32]​
	What might these layers of content be? There are various accounts that representationalists have proposed. Consider Tye’s proposal that the content of a pain experience not only represents bodily damage to your toe (say) but also represents that damage as bad.​[33]​ On this account, the representationalist could pursue the natural idea that in disassociation cases, an experience represents the occurrence of bodily damage but does not represent it as bad. Or consider a representationalist who countenances imperatival content.​[34]​ One way of developing that idea would be to say that in a pain experience, the subject has an assertoric content that “says” that there is bodily damage in the toe and an imperatival content that “says” in effect: “don’t do anything with your toe.” In the case of pain asymbolia, the second layer of content would be missing. (That said, we have some reservations about whether an imperative content—a command—can serve as a non-instrumental reason for bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behavior. Can a command rationalize beliefs, etc.?) A representationalist could even argue that such experiences represent a primitive property, much in the way that some philosophers argue that color-experiences represent primitive properties. And so on. 
We are not claiming here that any of these accounts is adequate as it stands; the details would have to be worked out. What we do claim is that insofar as representationalists do not limit themselves to a simple content, they have a straightforward approach to disassociation cases: namely, have such cases involve the pulling apart of the various contents of the pain experience. The proper lesson to draw from disassociation cases is that pain experiences are complex. Whether to proceed to the further conclusion that this complexity involves a non-intentional feature (be it a functional property or a quale) appended to an experience with a certain intentional content is very much an open question and nothing in the complexity itself requires that it be addressed in this manner. And if we remind ourselves that this awful feeling provides a non-instrumental reason for various bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviors, there will be a reason to prefer an account that locates the awfulness where the bodily damage is located. In any event, for a sufficiently sophisticated representationalist, disassociation cases do not present an insuperable difficulty but rather an opportunity to develop his view.

VI. Concluding Remarks
	We have argued that when it comes to offering an informative account of pain’s affect, the typical assessment found in the philosophical literature gets it exactly backwards. In fact, representationalism is the view that looks to be well positioned to say something informative, whereas its main competitors, functionalism and the qualia theory, struggle. In making pain’s affect constituted by its causal role, functionalism in effect claims that pain hurts because we do not like it. But this gets the explanatory direction the wrong way around. It is pain’s affect that explains our dislike, not vice-versa. Although this point has been acknowledged in the general literature on functionalism, it seems to have been lost on those, like Aydede, who are drawn to functionalist accounts of pain’s affective phenomenology.
	In our criticism of the (raw) qualia theory, we learned something significant about the way pain’s affect explains subsequent propositional attitudes and behavior. It not only causes these states, it rationalizes them. Drawing on the substantial literature on perceptual experience, we have argued that the particular way that pain’s affect rationalizes is by providing non-instrumental reasons in favor of bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behavior. By clearly articulating this insight, we uncover a powerful argument against qualia theories of pain’s affect and in favor of representationalism, an argument that less detailed accounts miss.
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